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The Politics of Israeli Archaeology: Between ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Science’ in the Age of the Second Republic

INTRODUCTION

Death is political, no less so in the past than in the present, and ancient burials are even more symbolic and powerful than modern burials. How the dead are treated in Israel today is a result not just of religious beliefs, but of the interplay of religion, politics, and economics. The archaeology of death is therefore a useful avenue for examining the position of archaeology as a whole in Israeli society. This study is directed by several questions.

The first question concerns the role of archaeology in the social and political dynamics of Israeli society. More specifically, how does archaeology fit into evolving social values and the politics of religious minorities? This is contextualized in terms of Arian’s ‘first republic’ and ‘second republic’ distinction. Second, how can we understand religious minority opposition to archaeology within ‘second republic’ politics? Since, even in a small society such as Israel, the concept and practice of archaeology is broad, our focus will be on the now supremely sensitive issue of mortuary remains, an issue at the intersection of personal, religious and social values. How does the Israeli experience compare with that of religious or other minorities in different societies? Third, what are the implications of archaeology’s changing place in understanding Israeli identity and social memory?

Whereas the social history of archaeology has become an important topic globally¹, for Israel these issues generally remain incompletely addressed.² While the relationship of archaeology to nationalist projects is fairly direct, this study demonstrates that attitudes toward archaeology are strongly conditioned by the balance of prevailing collective and individualist values, and, in turn, minority group politics. Being features of
relational and group self-definition, attitudes toward death and burial are highly dynamic, and are anything but static or timeless. Rather they are shaped by the exigencies and opportunities of the present, both in terms of religious and moral perceptions, and as a political tool. Because of the emergence of "second republic" individualizing values in modern Israel as elsewhere, death has become part of sectarian group politics, and archaeology has been drawn into the conflict. At their most extreme the fractures may pose a threat to national identity itself.

The example of Israel also demonstrates the success and failure of archaeology as it attempts to transcend its origins as a bourgeois "science" serving nationalism and modernism. In all these respects—the status of archaeology in society, the role of religious minorities in national politics, and the nature of nationalism—Israel is a harbinger of changes emerging worldwide.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In order to understand the current role of archaeology in Israeli society, and, specifically, the position of human remains as a flashpoint, an historical review is required. At the creation of the state of Israel, political authorities voluntarily ceded control over key aspects of lifecycle and symbolism to the small, Orthodox Jewish minority. While the founders of the state were resolutely secular (some even anti-religious) in outlook the mainstream Zionist movement felt an ethnic connection to the rituals of eastern European Orthodoxy. A Jewish state needed a Jewish component, and this was felt even more strongly after the Holocaust. Institutions such as a Chief Rabbinate were established and largely given over to the Orthodox communities and their new political parties. Along with the Ministry of Interior these institutions were made responsible for preserving various aspects of the Jewish lifecycle, including the registration and/or supervision of birth, marriage and divorce, conversion, burial, Sabbath, and dietary laws. In practical terms this had an impact on diverse areas, ranging from issuing passports and internal identity cards, to the overseeing of dietary laws and determining places of worship, dining, and entertainment, to the final judgment on the eligibility of an individual to be buried in a Jewish cemetery.

These were explicit compromises with built in contradictions. For reasons of politics and social psychology the Jewish state, with its secular majority, ceded control over key aspects of lifecycle, and lifestyle, to a reli-
gious minority. That this was fundamentally unstable was obvious from the beginning, and the early history of the state is filled with conflicts between various ultra-Orthodox groups and the state over Sabbath observance and draft exemptions. These core issues, centering on the outward Jewish character of the state, and more fundamentally, the preservation of protected space and prerogatives for ultra-Orthodox groups, remain central today. But the collectivist character of the ‘first Israeli republic’ made compromises possible, as did the incorporation of the Ottoman millet system, whereby religious minorities were ceded specific responsibilities.

The treatment of antiquities was enmeshed within these compromises, at first coincidentally and later explicitly. With the establishment in 1946 of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, followed in 1948 by the establishment of the state of Israel, the Department of Antiquities, which had existed under the British Mandate, was split between Israel and Jordan. The unique multi-ethnic institution, where British, Arab and Jew had worked together in apparent harmony, albeit under colonial direction, was fractured. In the aftermath of the 1948 war Israel lost access to the Palestine Archaeological Museum (now the Rockefeller Museum), the headquarters of the Department of Antiquities, and lost access to the facilities of the Institute of Archaeology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on Mount Scopus, both of which came under de facto Jordanian control. In July 1948 a new Department of Antiquities and Museums was founded under the auspices of Israel’s Public Works department of the Ministry of Labor, and was later transferred to the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Ministry was not initially given over to control of religious Jews by the Mapai government.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the activities of archaeology in Israel attracted relatively little attention from religious Jews. At the same time archaeology took its place as a central pillar of the Israeli secular identity. Israeli society was gripped by a deeply rooted embrace of the land, through study, fieldtrips, lectures and participation in excavations. This functioned at many levels. As Shavit has noted, the archaeological excavation of Biblical and Second Temple period sites demonstrated for some the connection of Israel with the land and states of their ancestors. For others, the secular enterprise of archaeological investigation was itself a means of developing Israel’s modernist credentials. Such a spread across high and middle culture is important for understanding the complexity of collectivist values. While it may be broadly characterized as ‘nationalist’ (as in the title of this paper), Israeli archaeology must be understood as meaning many things to different groups of people.
Among the many highlights of excavations during the 1950s, were those at the burial caves at Beth Shearim, which did not elicit a great response from religious groups. The annual meetings of the Israel Exploration Society were widely attended by lay people, and volunteers were enlisted by the Department of Antiquities to provide information on, and safeguard, sites. Among the most powerful figures in archaeology were Yigael Yadin and Benjamin Mazar, both of whom also played enormous roles in the development of the nation-state and its institutions, namely the military and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.¹⁰ All of these were perfectly in tune with the different dimensions of ‘first republic’ values.

Archaeology also performed an important function in the state of Israel’s foreign image, and foreign policy, showing the Jewish state in revival, investigating its past with the tools of science. The consolidation of several Tel Aviv area museums into Museum Ha’aretz in the early 1960s, and the 1965 establishment of the Israel Museum and the Shrine of the Book, the loan of museum objects overseas, study abroad by Israeli students, and participation in international conferences and associations by scholars, all contributed greatly to the high standing of the Israeli high culture.¹¹ The increasing involvement of foreign volunteers on Israeli excavations, beginning with Masada, and followed by American projects such as Gezer,


*Courtesy of the Israel Government Press Office*
also brought increasing numbers of American and European scholars and students in touch with Israeli society.

Finds that appeared electrifying, such as those at the Masada excavations, cemented the connection of Israel present with Israel past, and even captivated rabbinical authorities. The synagogue and other religious items at Masada, and the mass graves of what were thought to be Masada’s Jewish defenders, were a concrete presence. The military reburial of Bar-Kochba’s men in 1969 was originally demanded by Knesset members from the religious Agudat Israel party, and became a national event. It was broadcast on Israel’s new television service under the enthusiastic supervision of then Army Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren and marked a high point in Israel’s relationship with its past. During this relatively uncontentious, if not uncomplicated, period ultra-Orthodox communities generally remained small, marginal, and deliberately detached from most national concerns, including archaeology and the treatment of human remains. From there, however, the relationship gradually changed.¹²

ARCHAEOLOGY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

The late 1960s mark a turning point in Israeli history. The collective social identities forged in the Yishuv (pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) and tempered during the 1948 and 1956 wars, informed by archaeology, were tested once again in 1967 and found strong. A high period of archaeological industriousness began during the 1960s. It might also be argued that tensions in the self-perception of archaeology also began to emerge, as a set of disciplinary values, closely attuned to local social needs, moved toward a more self-consciously scientific stance. This was partially a result of the influence of global trends in archaeology and a higher level of internationalization that emerged during the 1960s, when more foreign archaeologists worked in Israel, and more Israelis traveled abroad.¹³ A measure of prosperity and integration laid the seeds for the individualization that culminated in the ‘second republic.’

The 1967 Six Day War is an event which obviously changed Israel’s self-perception and international status, and brought with it changes in archaeology. The Rockefeller Museum was captured, along with the Dead Sea Scrolls stored within it, and became the headquarters of the Department of Antiquities and Museums. The exploration of the newly acquired West Bank, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula were focal points for a new generation of archaeologists who had been trained by figures such as Yadin
and Mazar. Israeli control over the West Bank encompassed numerous Biblical and post-Biblical sites, including many which previously had, or began to acquire, religious significance, not least of which was the Western Wall in Jerusalem. Control over the West Bank also included several million Palestinians, previously under Jordanian administration.

The nationalist component of archaeology by no means disappeared after 1967, but began to manifest primarily in popular interest of religious nationalist groups, who saw control over the Biblical homelands of Judea and Samaria as the culmination of Israel’s mission and relationship with God. Their emphasis on the nation’s foundation in religious solidarity contributed to the fragmentation of collective values based on consensus.¹⁴ During the years following 1967 the newly re-acquired Western Wall was gradually transformed from a site of national commemoration to one controlled almost exclusively by and for religious nationalist and, increasingly, ultra-Orthodox communities. Israeli archaeology continued its trend toward greater professionalization and international integration, but at home the practice and fruits of archaeology were, in effect, being fractured.

During the 1970s the balances of political power in Israel began to change decisively.¹⁵ The founding generation of political leaders who had fashioned the social compromises passed from the scene, and the election of Menachem Begin signaled the shift to the right in Israeli politics and society. Other tensions bubbled to the surface before and after the traumatic October 1973 war, especially deeply rooted animosity on the part of the Mizrahi eastern communities toward the Ashkenazis of European origin, and their traditional dominance of the country’s political, economic, and cultural institutions. Public protest, sometimes violent, became frequent, as Mizrahi activists began demanding compensation for past grievances and a reapportionment of state resources. A parade of small reform parties also fragmented the dominance of the Labor party, making coalition politics a virtual necessity. In many ways the right-wing Likud’s 1977 Knesset victory was a political turning point.

Religious political parties found their positions enhanced by the fragmented politics and general atmosphere of recompense and cultural issues were used as further leverage. During the late 1970s and 1980s the minor concessions granted to religious communities during the state’s early days, such as military exemptions and financial subsidies for independent religious school systems, were codified and expanded. After 1984 religious political parties were able to gain power directly through their manipulation of coalition politics, since without their help none of the major parties
could muster sufficient majorities to form a government. In cultural terms these religious parties were increasingly augmented by Mizrahi Jews adopting ultra-Orthodox Hasidic ways, in a curious amalgamation of several conservative trends. Although Eastern European ultra-Orthodoxy disdained the secular structure of the state and its elite groups, the emergent Mizrahi ultra-Orthodoxy did not have an anti-Zionist orientation.

Like Menahem Begin and the Likud party in general, Israel’s Mizrahi population also scorned what they considered the western elite in Israeli state and society, and shared an ingrained distrust of Arabs and Islamic society. In both the Likud and Mizrahi communities there was a kind of anti-modernism, the result of swift and wrenching encounters with modernization wrought by the early socialist state, and a growing sense of entitlement for past discrimination. Furthermore, in both there were strong charismatic and messianic currents, which lead to the dominance of rabbinical authorities, mysticism, the development of a new sacred geography and rituals at archaeological sites, such as tombs of newly defined or rediscovered ‘holy men’. The Likud party played its own role in this process of recreating the social and geographic landscape of authority and veneration by elevating the position of Ze’ev Jabotinsky and, in archaeological terms, by trying to co-opt whatever public enthusiasm existed for archaeology by mandating the reburial of additional bones believed to be those of Bar-Kochba’s warriors. In the broader sense, however, it would appear that the Likud’s visceral nationalism did not require the same quasi-rational foundations provided by archaeology that formed part of the Labor approach.

The first systematic opposition to archaeology that focused on treatment of human remains emerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The initial flashpoint of religious animosity toward archaeology were the excavations at the City of David, the Biblical heart of Jerusalem. The animosity was also personified in the demonization of the project director, Yigal Shiloh of the Hebrew University. Archaeological excavations had been conducted in Jerusalem for well over a century, and there had been several Moslem riots during the 19th century in protest of what they perceived as threats to Holy Places. The Moslem concept of Christian and Jewish attacks on or under the Temple Mount has become a distinctive rhetorical trope, deserving of separate study, along with the possibility that such a trope has been transferred to ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities.

Jewish opposition to archaeology was late in coming, but became more focused and ultimately more successful. In 1981 members of various sects, led by chief rabbis Shlomo Goren and Ovadia Yosef, clashed violently with
archaeologists at the City of David, hurling stones and accusations that excavations were being carried out on a (non-existent) Jewish cemetery. Rabbi Goren threatened the late Education Minister, Zevulun Hammer, with excommunication if he did not close down the excavation. Hammer conceded, but his decision was overruled by the High Court.¹⁹

A number of tactics evolved during the City of David confrontations, which in later years would become standard ultra-Orthodox practice. Protestors would clandestinely search the excavations at night for what they identified as human remains. Well-publicized confrontations took place in front of cameras, during which the project director debated with protestors, most famously waving animal bones, which his opponents apparently regarded as human remains. Ultimately, Shiloh found himself the victim of a vicious slander campaign, which took the distinctive form of posters throughout Jerusalem and the religious neighborhoods of other cities, complete with Jewish mystical curses. Shiloh succumbed to cancer in 1988 and the excavations were shut down. The confrontations at the City of David were soon extended to other sites, especially in the Jerusalem area, completely radicalizing the public image of archaeology. Gabriel Barkay, who excavated Iron Age tombs in Jerusalem in 1976, noted that he was aided by rabbinical students during his original excavations,
Ultra-orthodox demonstrating against the desecration of Jewish graves during archaeological excavations in the city of David, Jerusalem in 1994. The banner reads: “The world is shocked by the desecration of Jewish graves on the slopes of the Temple Mount by archaeologist robbers.”

*Courtesy of the Israel Government Press Office*

Ultra-orthodox demonstrating against the desecration of Jewish graves in 1994. The banner reads: “The whole world is shocked at the archaeologists.”
while a subsequent season in 1994 was met with violent protests resulting in numerous injuries.²⁰

The ultra-Orthodox-haredi objection to disturbing human remains, based on the thesis that it is disrespectful to the dead, that it causes the dead to tremble in fear of God’s final judgment, and that disinterring bodies may render them incomplete and therefore unsuitable for resurrection, is a distortion of the precepts of Talmudic Judaism.²¹ But the identity of haredi opponents to archaeology shows how the issue migrated across ultra-Orthodox interest groups. The major force on the ground facing off against archaeologists were local groups such as Toldot Aharon, but the involvement of the anti-Zionist Agudat Israel party and the chief rabbis, Shlomo Goren and Ovadia Yosef, were key features which mobilized broader spectrum religious opposition. By the summer of 1983 Agudat Israel was able to turn out several thousand protestors at the City of David. The archaeologists’ offices were burned, and the graves of several archaeologists were desecrated. At the same time, the full force of archaeology as an issue in coalition politics was being felt, as Agudat Israel introduced a bill giving religious authorities the power to stop the excavation of any site thought to contain graves.²²

Why the emphasis on human remains at this time? Some speculations are possible.²³ Ultra-Orthodox communities and their political parties were emboldened by the weakness of both Labor and Likud and their own growing strength within coalition politics. The Western Wall had effectively become their territory, and the adjacent City of David was too close to ignore. The question of archaeology also meshed perfectly with other issues, including maintenance of orthodox control over conversion to Judaism, and long-standing opposition to other secular ‘desecration’ such as abortion and public transportation and commerce on the Sabbath. At the same time archaeologists had difficulty making their case to the secular public, let alone to those educated in the state-funded, anti-modernist school systems of ultra-Orthodoxy.²⁴ During this period Jewish settlement in the West Bank was also becoming an increasingly high government priority, which made it vulnerable to coalition pressure. Finally, the value of archaeology as a wedge issue, capable of separating Mizrahi Jews from the Ashkenazi mainstream, was probably being sensed. The apparent disrespect which the almost exclusively Ashkenazi archaeological community showed toward human remains echoed strongly with many Mizrahi Jews, who saw no need to desecrate their ancestors in order to validate science or Israel’s national identity. The founding of the “Shas” party in 1984, with the blessing of Rabbi Shach, introduced a new force into Israeli politics, but
one that followed the ultra-Orthodox lead. First republic values were thus being recast and pivoted against the second republic, as an anti-modernist political collectivity took political power.

Counter-protests organized by archaeologists during the 1980s turned out many hundreds of participants, but the cause began to be increasingly identified with the Israeli left. At the level of public consciousness, archaeology had not successfully defined itself or its contribution beyond the formation of national claims or ethnic identity. Since the personal and national identities of most Israelis were largely set, popular consciousness now was focused on economic development and peace with neighboring Arab countries. The second republic pursuit of individual values and aspirations took precedence over those of society at large, and the role of the state was seen not as the protector of the collective, but rather of the individual. But for the ultra-orthodox archaeology’s social contribution was wholly negative. It served as a foundation for the Zionist apostasy, endorsing an entirely illegitimate secular worldview, and engaging in countless desecration. Ironically, this outlook contributed to the inversion or involution of ‘first republic’ values among the newly broadened ultra-Orthodox communities and their anti-Zionist, Mizrahi oriented, and nationalist religious political parties. All sought to participate in coalition governments, in no small part in order to increase state support for their causes, and, by so doing, to assume the mantle of communitarianism.

The state’s contradictory position as defender of both individual and minority group rights is be found throughout the Western world. In Israel the contribution made by archaeology to tourism, and hence the economy, was increasingly understood. The 1980s saw the beginnings of a European-style orientation toward ‘heritage management,’ attempts to maintain an explicit balance between the preservation of sites, economic development, and the potential economic viability of excavation and reconstruction. But this was executed—most notably at Beth She’an and Caesaria—in the tradition of archaeology as public works, a pattern which had originated with the establishment of the Israeli state. Burials and human remains, increasingly controversial and by nature less attractive to tourism, did not figure prominently in the development of archaeological policy.

**TOWARD THE END**

Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s ultra-Orthodox political parties gained seats in Israel’s parliament, took over control of additional ministries—including the Ministry of Education—and became more vocal in
their cultural demands. An unofficial form of archaeological supervision developed, where roving ultra-Orthodox investigators in search of human remains visiting excavations with, and more frequently without, the permission of excavators. In 1987 protests were extended beyond Jerusalem to an American excavation at Caesaria.²⁷ From late 1987 the intifada impeded archaeological work, and the growing wave of Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union provided the government with a more pressing series of issues, the first being the question of ‘Who is a Jew?’

Archaeological work continued during the late 1980s and early 1990s, driven increasingly by housing and highway construction. Projects in and around Jerusalem such as in French Hill, Mamilla and the Armenian Church west of the Damascus Gate were the cause of large-scale protests. After three days of rioting in 1992, 16 ossuaries from French Hill were turned over to religious authorities and reburied.²⁸ A crypt containing bones was found below the Armenian Church and this discovery produced protests and resulted in the mutilation of a Greek-language mosaic.²⁹ At the end of 1992 the United Torah Judaism party charged that the legislation introduced by Agudat Israel in 1983 in fact forbade the examination of human bones.³⁰ A lawsuit brought after the French Hill protests to the High Court by the Atra Kadish Society produced a ruling that burials were indeed antiquities but this, too, was subsequently challenged.

In 1992 the Shas party became an important political force when it entered a coalition with Yitzhak Rabin, defying Rabbi Schach but under the leadership of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and Aryeh Deri. By 1994 the Rabin government was deeply engaged in trying to create a peace agreement with the Palestinians and further beholden to political coalitions. Protests against archaeology spread to Migdal HaEmek and to Modi’in, and in the latter case Rabin himself was forced to suspend the excavations for a period. Protests at Modi’in continued in 1995 but by 1996 the United Torah Judaism party was in charge of the Housing Ministry and the excavation was shut down.³¹ Calls for direct control over archaeology through modification of the 1978 Antiquities Law, which had defined ancient graves and their contents as antiquities, also increased.³²

It should be recalled that the legal definition of ‘who is a Jew’ was being hotly debated in living terms throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, as hundreds of thousands of new immigrants were arriving from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia.³³ In practical terms the increasing focus by a wider range of ultra-Orthodox political parties may be seen in part as fighting the battle on another ground. This entailed the dramatic rejection of the ‘archaeological’ categories which had contributed to early Israeli identity, and an anti-modernist and anti-scientific expansion of
Jewish identity. Ultra-Orthodoxy in general rejects anything outside the Biblical accounts and chronology, limiting the age of the world to just over 5760 years. Prehistory is therefore anathema; there is simply no framework for understanding or accepting what might have come before. Assertions that the ‘Holy Land’ was fundamentally multi-ethnic in antiquity are also highly suspect. While Biblical and Jewish texts do, of course, speak of other ethnic and religious groups, the inclination has been to err on the side of safety and regard virtually all human remains as those of Jews. This practical and cognitive process strengthens the exclusivity of the Jewish people and their claim to the ‘Holy Land,’ and the primacy of the ultra-Orthodox monopoly on defining who was, and is, a Jew. Since ultra-Orthodoxy rejects the critical apparatus of archaeology and history, and regards the presence of other ethnic and religious groups as a sort of apostasy, most ancient burials must necessarily be considered those of Jews.

From an intellectual and political stand point, precisely how this evolution took place deserves further study. A superficial observation suggests that haredi communities conducted a series of separatist battles during the later 1990s, with different groups taking on different roles. Knesset battles over issues such as school and community subsidies, draft exemptions, archaeology, marriage and conversion, were fought increasingly by parties such as United Torah Judaism, and the ultra-Orthodox position was effected de facto by ministers from a variety of parties, not least of all Shas. But despite these gains the anti-Zionist street was extremely active. The protests during 1996 and 1997 over the closing of Jerusalem’s Bar-Ilan Street suggest a complementary effort to complete the physical separation from secular communities. Opposition from the civil rights party, Meretz, and other leftist parties only served to further unite the ultra-Orthodox community.

In fact, the archaeological institutions themselves found resistance difficult if not futile. Reforms in the late 1980s had transferred the administration of archaeology from the Ministry of Education and Culture to an independent agency, the Israel Antiquities Authority. This move was intended to heighten the independence and professionalism of the archaeological service. In practical terms, it also deprived the authority of some of its budget and ministerial support. Funds would have to be raised externally through negotiations with building contractors unfortunate enough to uncover archaeological remains during the course of planning or construction. The trends to circumvent the legal requirement to have areas checked by archaeologists prior to construction, to cease work if archaeological remains were discovered, and to fund the excavation of remains, accelerated
throughout the 1990s. The tremendous expansion of cities and settlements throughout Israel during this period also put great stress on the archaeological system. The incentives for cooperation with the antiquities authority were thus low, and legal wrangling continues to this day.³⁶

In 1994, Israel’s Attorney General presented a clarified ruling on the legal status of human remains. To the surprise and dismay of the archaeological community, the ruling stated that while ancient graves were antiquities and could be excavated, human remains were not, in fact, archaeological artifacts, and that transfer of remains to the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs should take place, preferably at the excavation site. This ruling was a landmark. The issue of reburial had emerged slowly but was firmly institutionalized by the 1990s. One result was that numerous prehistoric, pagan, Christian and Moslem remains were in a sense belatedly adopted into the Jewish community, or were at least put under Jewish control. The status of Bar Kochba’s warriors and other remains from Masada became implicated in the debate when the ultra-Orthodox asserted that some remains were still kept in laboratories rather than being reburied. During 1996 over 300 boxes of human remains, of Jews and non-Jews alike, were delivered to the Ministry of Religious Affairs for reburial.³⁷ It is not clear how the non-Jewish remains, labeled as such, were treated. Another result was the virtual end of physical anthropology in Israel, once a highly respected field. The archaeological community in Israel protested bitterly, but its star had fallen to such an extent that there was nothing to be done to reverse or even slow the process.

In 1996 representatives of the ultra-Orthodox communities called upon the Prime Minister to fire the director of the antiquities authority. At the same time archaeologists were experiencing personal harassment such to an extent that the Israel Antiquities Authority telephone directory became a classified document.³⁸ By 1998 religious affairs ministry representatives were actually present on a number of excavations and removed bones without archaeological supervision.³⁹

In 1998 the Israel Antiquities Authority facility at Nahalal was firebombed, resulting in considerable loss of material, and in 1998 and 1999 the Authority saw its budget reduced by 75%.⁴⁰ Also in 1998, an interesting dispute arose within the ultra-Orthodox community when Rabbi Shalom Eliashiv of the Jerusalem Rabbinical Council ruled that a Roman burial ground on the course of a planned road to the new suburb of Pisgat Ze’ev could be moved, a decision which was met by denunciations and stoning of the elderly rabbi’s car.⁴¹ By the end of the 1990s, violent ultra-Orthodox protests against archaeological excavations once largely been restricted to
the Jerusalem area became established throughout Israel, including projects run by Israeli and foreign universities, such as the Harvard University project at Ashkelon.⁴²

However, archaeology remained a touchstone for nationalist sentiment. The September 1996 government decision to permit the opening of a tunnel to be used by tourists along the Western Wall resulted in several weeks of Arab rioting and a number of deaths. In retrospect this seems to have been a throwback, both in terms of the Palestinian response to rumored threats to the Temple Mount, and the Israeli government's efforts to archaeological evidence to demonstrate the Jewish nature of Jerusalem.⁴³ Similarly, the ‘Jerusalem 3000’ celebrations during 1995–1996 were aimed, however indirectly, at reactivating the traditional relationship between Zionism and archaeology, albeit largely for foreign consumption.

It may be suggested that, as part of their general anti-science and anti-modern agenda, the ultimate goal of some ultra-Orthodox politicians is to eliminate archaeology altogether.⁴⁴ Control over the administration of archaeology is therefore a key element. After repeated requests, the government agreed that it would appoint rabbinical representatives to the Archaeological Council, to ensure that religious interests are represented.⁴⁵ The council, whose responsibilities include awarding licenses to excavate particular sites, is essentially the body in charge of setting archaeological policy. The professional archaeological community has protested repeatedly that the appointment of rabbinical representatives would debase the professional nature of the council, but this view has not prevailed. In December 2001 the government announced a further 38% cut in financial support for the Israel Antiquities Authority, leaving its future in even further doubt.

DEATH AND REBIRTH?

How much of the rise and fall of archaeology in Israel was political and how much was religious? To be sure, the two can never be completely separated, but must exist in an uneasy state of imbalance. Archaeology in Israel was at once a spectacular success and a dismal failure. It helped create something utterly new, but has failed to provide for its own continued existence. In its ‘second republic’ phase the Zionist enterprise, which strove to understand its connection with the land, had little need for one of its most articulate messengers. Indeed, it was precisely in the context of fragmenting collective values and emerging communal (and coalition) politics, that attacks on archaeology have intensified. To be sure, archaeology in Israel continues. The Israel Antiquities Authority conducts hundreds of
various sized projects each year. University-based archaeologists continue
to attract students and financial support. The latter is largely derived from
private foreign sources, both Christians who see the Zionist enterprise as
part of a larger unfolding of God’s plan, and Jews promoting traditional
Zionist narratives of progress and rebirth.

In a sense, Israeli archaeology is neither milk nor meat. As a humanistic
discipline developed within a Germanic university setting, it was ideally
suited to make a contribution to the Zionist enterprise. But the close, indeed
virtually inextricable, relationship with the Bible and Jewish history has
meant that the evolution into a scientific stance, characterized by secular
skepticism, has been difficult. Expectations on all sides have been difficult to
transcend, and the public has been irritated by Israeli archaeology’s attempt
to reinstate itself as a science. Most recently, this irritation has expressed
itself in the hostile reactions of politicians to academic debates over the
historicity of David and Solomon, and the Bible generally. Both the right
and the left see these as ‘post-Zionist’ and believe they are intended to
deprive the nation of its legitimacy.⁴⁶ Such self-critical disciplinary debates
must in fact be divorced from anti-Zionist attacks on the relationship of
Israel to the past which come from Palestinians and from other sources.
But despite the controversies over post-Zionism, however, the abstract
and sentimentalized vision of archaeology has been detached from the
practice. Concrete support, in terms of budgets for the Israel Antiquities
Authority, and legal and legislative initiatives to protect antiquities have
been conspicuously absent.

Public interest in archaeology and archaeological issues has dropped
dramatically. Those few archaeologists who explicitly coordinate their
findings with Biblical accounts are of interest primarily to religious
nationalists.⁴⁷ Even the outcry over the evisceration of the Temple Mount
by Palestinian Moslem religious authorities enthusiastically removing all
traces of Jewish past as they construct additional space for worship has been
minimal.⁴⁸ Public and political apathy toward archaeology is clearly grow-
ing, and the relationship between Zionism and Judaism continues to be
attenuated.⁴⁹ Some retrenchment of ‘traditional’ sympathy toward Israeli
archaeology may have occurred in the context of the latest war with the
Palestinians, due in no small measure to their blatant denial of any Jewish
connection to Israel, Jerusalem in particular, and general manipulation
of the past.⁵⁰ But the long-term trend for Israeli archaeology is toward a
subsidiary position of serving economic rather than social needs.

The contrasts between the structure of archaeology in Israel and in
other western states are easily recognizable. In the West, the survival of
archaeology is complex, but has been generally accomplished by disciplin-
ary alignment with the progressive narratives of ‘science’ and ‘heritage,’ each of which have been widely promoted as values in themselves. While the comparable connection between Israeli archaeology and modernism, in the form of Zionism, is clear, it has not promoted itself as a dispassionate science in service to humanity. Institutionally, Israeli archaeologists, even prehistorians, are situated almost exclusively in humanities faculties.

In the West the place of archaeology has also been buttressed by successfully constructing institutions and laws to cement the place of archaeology in society. The situation of the majority of Western archaeologists within the discipline and scientific rhetoric of ‘anthropology’ has acted as another key to institutionalization. Strong professional organizations contributed materially to the pursuit of disciplinary goals, through the promulgation of common standards and practices, discourse, and, critically, relations with the legislative and executive branches of government. In the United States legislation such as the 1966 Historic Sites Preservation Act, and the incorporation of archaeological requirements into the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act created a broad legal basis for the practice of archaeology. Such legislation, often replicated at the state level, also had the effect of creating the non-academic, for-profit service industry of ‘Cultural Resource Management,’ (CRM) responsible for assessing and recording archaeological sites and landscapes, and historic properties. Finally, the CRM industry and the legally-based preservation of historical ‘resources’ helped foster the corollary tourist industries of historic sites, parks, and their service sectors. Archaeology in the United States is a business worth several hundred million dollars a year. This alone makes the industry a force to be reckoned with. In comparison, the legal and financial bases of Israeli archaeology remain perilously weak.

Critical to the discussion here is the role of ‘descendent communities.’ The treatment of Native Americans by the North American archaeological and anthropological communities is well-known and does academia little credit. Direct opposition to archaeology was manifest by the early 1970s with the disruption of an excavation in Minnesota by members of the American Indian Movement. By the 1980s coalitions of Native American groups were promoting legislation which would provide for the protection of sites and burials, and the return of human remains and specified artifacts. Although strenuously resisted by archaeologists and professional organizations, these efforts culminated in passage of the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). This legislation, (together with parallel state laws), mandated the inventory and repatriation of human remains and sacred objects in the possession of any publicly
funded institution to descendents, and regulated the future excavation of human remains on federally owned land. Not surprisingly, defining terms such as ‘lineal descendents’ and ‘sacred objects’ has proven difficult in practice. Archaeologists seriously misunderstood both public and legislative sentiment and many have complained bitterly about the negative impact on science, and the privileging of Native American religions and claims.⁵⁴

Despite controversies with native groups, considerable leeway still exists in the United States to conduct archaeology and to analyze human remains, albeit in highly regulated and litigious environment. Only a few tribal groups object unconditionally to the analysis of human remains; many employ their own archaeologists and others are open to respectful collaboration with archaeologists. Where the issue has been raised most vocally, as in the case of 9,000–year-old human remains from Washington State deemed ‘Kennewick Man,’ it has been as much the result of specific activists vying for internal power, conditions of competition between tribal groups, or with the government, as religious beliefs or scientific hubris.⁵⁵ The parallels with the efforts to control archaeology by the ultra-Orthodox Jewish haredim are inescapable.

The competition for the past is an increasingly profound feature of established democratic and recently democratic societies. Often, religious or other minorities, some of whom may—or would like to—be construed as descendents, find themselves vying for political and social power. Specific examples of this are found in the controversy over who would be permitted to excavate, study, and ‘interpret’ or ‘represent’ a 19th century African-American burial ground in lower Manhattan.⁵⁶ Parallel disputes have emerged in Hawaii, Africa, and South Africa, and may be expected throughout the ‘post-colonial’ world. Similar mechanisms have also come into play in Europe, particularly after the collapse of Communism, as groups in the present vied for power and identities by re-imagining the past. There, however, the drama has often been inverted; reburial is a form of re-consecration and social rebirth of neglected or reclaimed personages rather than the erection or reclamation of a portion of the past.⁵⁷ In this respect there are some parallels with the pattern in Israel of ultra-Orthodox and religious nationalist veneration of various tombs and holy sites. Control over the past is primarily a question of establishing a tangible presence and placing limits on the processes of investigation and interpretation.

None of this suggests that minorities, religious, descendent or otherwise, are necessarily dishonest about their concern for human remains. But in democracies those concerns, whatever their time or place of inspiration, can only be realized in a political setting. Among other things, they are
convenient and powerful instruments for minority groups to wield against
the majority, since they explicitly call into question majority values. The
semblance of an appropriate approach to human remains is a strong com-
ponent of respectability, as is the secession of space and some prerogatives
to minority communities. Among archaeological professionals, the need
to maintain respectability has entailed the promulgation of ethical codes,
which also conveniently serve as instruments of disciplinary self-regulation. In the era of global identity politics, archaeologists have become
another interest group.

In general terms, and contrary to many studies, the development
of Israel’s approach to the past supports David Lowenthal’s distinction
between ‘heritage’ and ‘history’ which suggests that “History seeks to
convince by truth, and succumbs to falsehood. Heritage exaggerates and
omits, candidly invents and frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and
error.” The profession of archaeology in Israel has shifted toward this posi-
tion, but this new role has troubled politicians, the public, and increasingly
empowered minority groups. Resistance to history is a familiar situation.
For example, the American historians and curators who attempted to design
an exhibit around the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the first atomic
bomb, sought to seriously discuss the question of Japanese casualties. This
effort was condemned by veterans and politicians as unpatriotic, politically
correct, and dismissive of the American war effort.

Archaeology remains caught in an intrinsic contradiction—its tradi-
tional, nationally oriented role collides with its liberal, universalistic ideals.
Minorities assert their rights under a liberal concept of rights to claim a
particular heritage, and by so doing may appeal to nationalism (and nation-
alists) or religious sensibilities, and the banner of liberalism’s protection of
minorities. The simultaneous claim on the universal and the particular, and
the potential to mobilize strong public sentiment both ways, is a cognitive
and practical feat which archaeology cannot duplicate at present. Typically,
minorities have used their power over the past to further political aims. In
this respect Israel is similar to countries like Canada and Australia which
find themselves increasingly challenged by the growing power of aboriginal
communities. In most places, however, archaeology is not yet capable of
provoking crises resulting in mass mobilization, which in turn threatens
the state. In Israel the development of ultra-Orthodoxy stands in direct
opposition to the dominant nationalist narrative, and is— theoretically at
least—capable of completely undermining the democratic nature of the
state. The potential of minority power to ultimately unravel the territorial
integrity of states like Canada should also not be underestimated. At the
most fundamental level, as many have pointed out, democracy hands those who do not believe in it the means of its own undoing.

It is unclear where Israeli archaeology will stand in the end. Its potential rebirth as a 'heritage industry', along the European model, or American-style 'cultural resource management' remains to be seen. The specter of a Disneyfied past may be the best that can be hoped for. These varying paths, however, may also be the only means by which the past can be shared and multiple versions enunciated. As Israeli historiography and historical memory become demythologized and less hegemonic it is unclear how archaeology will be incorporated and by whom. The continued development of mainstream Israeli identity, however, may eventually entail a rediscovery of archaeology, in the sense of a local, nostalgic, consumer-oriented complement to the frenetic, globalized dimensions of Israeli life. Expanding haredi control over archaeology, and revisionism toward other pillars of Israeli memory, such as the centrality of the Holocaust (which is assessed increasingly below assimilation in the hierarchy of Jewish tragedy) may been seen as part of a trend toward the minority, becoming in effect the arbiter of social memory, which will complicate any secular developments.

We may hope for a number of developments. These include continued professionalization of Israeli archaeology, the strengthening of legal protections for antiquities (at present an unlikely prospect), the enhancement of international cooperation, the development of archaeological interest group politics (a type of transnational identity, or set of values), and the continued growth of Israeli second republic politics. The problem of finding a respectful middle ground between archaeologists and the ultra-Orthodox might at best be negotiated on the basis of broadly informed, as well as Jewish, ethics. The stakes, in terms of political and economic power which support ultra-Orthodox separatism, have been too high for factions in power to consider compromise over issues such as draft deferments and educational subsidies, even during the latest war with the Palestinians. Compromise with archaeologists, therefore, seems unlikely.

In local, cross-cultural terms, it must also be noted that some democratic and quasi-democratic societies possess tensions similar to those described here. In Turkish archaeology many of these tensions were circumvented by the resolutely secular nature of the republic. The Pan-Turkism of early republic period, which posited racial connections with distant Sumerian and Hittite cultures, was largely superseded by Anatolianism, a geographic-national approach centered around the many cultures of Anatolia itself, and which benefited from Atatürk’s direct support.
The situation in Arab countries, however, is vastly complicated by the contradictions inherent between their various pasts. Arab, Islamic, colonial, and even tribal components must compete for historical valorization, but, like Arab nationalism itself, these elements—especially the super secessionist nature of Islam—are mutually incompatible. Egypt has long had an ambivalent relationship with its pharaonic antiquities, while in Lebanon there has long been tension resulting from the colonial and Christian promotion of the Phoenician past over other elements. In Jordan the relationship with the past has been complicated by the tensions between two sets of emerging identities, Jordanian and Palestinian.65

In the anti-democratic Arab world the use of archaeology has been more direct and the manipulations more blatant. In Ba’athist Iraq this has entailed episodes of glorification of the Mesopotamian and Islamic pasts, with varying emphases laid on the pan-Arab and ‘Iraqi’ elements. The virtual enthronement of Saddam Hussein as a Mesopotamian king is inescapable. He has patronized archaeology heavily, including supporting the rebuilding of Babylon at the height of the Iran-Iraq war and in 2001 with the founding of the “Saddam Institute for Cuneiform Studies” at the University of Mosul. Needless to say, research into the various ethnic groups of Iraq has been not been encouraged. In Syria the contradictions of archaeology and identity have been compounded not only by colonialism but the ultimate contraction of socio-political leadership to schismatic version of Ba’athism led by a heretic sect. A possible outgrowth of this has been the development of a purely ‘Syrian’ terminology for the Bronze Age66. Not surprisingly, both Western and local archaeologists in those countries have been reluctant to adopt a critical stance towards the contexts in which they work. The realization that ‘indigenous’ 20th century archaeology in the Middle East has served as another pillar of home-grown totalitarianism has been generally ignored in favor of shallow post-colonial and orientalist critiques.67 The edifice of new mythologies built atop of old grows continually larger.

CONCLUSION

Because they are tangible, visceral, and evocative human remains have been easy to manipulate as a political issue, under the guise of religious and moral concerns. In this respect, second republic Israel stands at the extreme end of a familiar continuum, the relationship of democratic society to internal minorities or native peoples. But as the above review shows, at its heart the
issue is not a dichotomy between morality and modernity, or even control over the past, but communities competing for power and resources. In this equally familiar story, the dead are enlisted alongside the living.

Notes


9. The literature on the construction of Israeli identity is too vast to be cited in depth here. The role of archaeology in the construction of Israeli identity has

It is also useful to note that the creation of the Israeli identity entailed other explicit contradictions between ‘Jewish’ and ‘modernist’ elements, such as the Hebraicization of the landscape, largely on the basis of the Bible. See Maoz Azaryahu and Arnon Golan, “(Re) Naming the Landscape: The Formation of the Hebrew Map of Israel 1949–1960,” Journal of Historical Geography, 27 (2001): 178–95. For a succinct statement regarding the contradictions between Zionism and Judaism, see Daniel Levy, “The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel,” History and Theory, 38 (1999) 51–66, especially page 54. These lend further support to Shavit’s observation. Such observations on historical and cultural complexity should not be read as facile invocation of paradox, as feared by Avishai Margalit in the introduction to his Views in Review, Politics and Culture in the State of Israel (New York, 1998).

10. For Yadin see the biography by Neil Asher Silberman, A Prophet from Amongst You, the Life of Yigael Yadin: Soldier, Scholar, and Mythmaker of Modern Israel, (Reading, MA, 1993). For Mazar see the obituary “In Memorium: Benjamin Mazar,” Israel Exploration Journal, 45 (1995): 209–211. Broshi (note 2) makes the interesting observation that the Israel Exploration Society meetings which had 1,000 participants during the early 1950s would be the equivalent of 250,000 Americans.


12. Ben-Yehuda (note 9) 241–243. Broshi (note 2) also points out, however, that a no confidence motion was proposed by the National Religious Front in 1960 after Ben-Gurion suggested that the exodus from Egypt had consisted of 600 families, rather than 600,000 adults.


26. See Arian (note 6) and Edelman (note 5).


34. This position appears to have been tempered more recently, with some acknowledgment that certain prehistoric and Islamic-period burials may not be those of Jews. Personal communication from archaeologists who wish to remain anonymous. The request for anonymity highlights the sensitivity of individual archaeologists, and exposes their perception of vulnerability to retaliation. Note, however, the recent search of the Tel Aviv University Medical School’s anatomy department by Rabbi Moshe Gafni of the United Torah Judaism party. “Orthodox Jews demand university bury its bones,” *BMJ* (formerly British Medical Journal)
2001; 322:1084 (5 May). Contrast also the statement by Rabbi Breitowitz (note 21), “While a majority of the world population may be non-Jewish, a majority of the bodies buried in Eretz Yisrael over thousands of years may certainly be assumed to be Jewish.”


37. See the web site of the Israel Antiquities Authority at http://www.israntique.org.il/eng/potext.html.

38. Personal observation.


44. Several reviewers took issue with the suggestion made here that ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel are opposed to archaeology as a whole rather than simply the excavation of burials. The question is a broad one and deserves separate study. The following quote from Rabbi Shlomo Goren suggests his personal view:

“In explaining his opposition to the dig, Goren said, ‘I don’t consider archaeology a real science.’ The remarks were made in an interview reported Sept. 5. ‘So they find some bones,’ the rabbi said. ‘Here in Israel the Jewish people don’t need further evidence. The charter of Israel on the Holy Land is the Bible.’ “Court Lifts City of David Ban,” Facts on File World News Digest, November 20, 1981. The original interview with Goren was apparently with a Hebrew language newspaper. Another telling quote is that of activist Yehuda Meshi-Zahav, “I know where I come from; I don’t need proof.” “Fierce Protest Over Bones Threatens to Halt Archaeology in Israel,” Biblical Archaeology Review, Nov/Dec 1997.


47. “Altars and Egos,” *Ha’aretz*, June 30, 2000, discussing the work of Professor Adam Zertal of the University of Haifa.


50. Palestinian efforts to assert their claim to the archaeology of the Southern Levant have a long history. The Christian Palestinian Dimitri Constantinos Baramki, formerly an employee of the Mandatory Palestine Department of Antiquities, was employed for many years by the American University of Beirut, and in 1969 authored *The Art and Architecture of Ancient Palestine: a Survey of the Archaeology of Palestine from the Earliest Times to the Ottoman Conquest*. This was published in the series *Silsilat ‘Kutub Filastiniyah*” by the Research Center of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The P.L.O. also sponsored a number of archaeological conferences during the 1980s in Aleppo. For brief overviews of the Palestinian perspective see Glock 1994 and 1995 (note 2). These remain the most coherent Palestinian statements regarding archaeology, an irony which is compounded by the fact that Glock was an American Lutheran. See now the
discussion of Glock’s life and death, probably at the hand of Hamas, by Edward Fox, *Palestine Twilight: The Murder of Dr Edward Glock and the Archeology of the Holy Land*, (London, 2001). Departments of Archaeology exist in most Palestinian universities and an official Palestinian Department of Antiquities was established as part of the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities. Tourism and consciousness raising are the stated goals of the Palestinian archaeological enterprise (interview with Department of Antiquities director Hamdan Taha, *Palestine Report*, July 16 1999). The aims of the Palestinian Institute of Archaeology and Journal of Palestinian Archaeology at Bir Zeit University include the “shaping Palestinian historical consciousness” and “relevant independent answers, methodological or ideological, to questions concerning their cultural heritage and country:” (see http://www.birzeit.edu/ourvoice/society/feb2k/jpa.html#pia). A full analysis of the Palestinian archaeological enterprise is beyond the scope of the present study. An impression gathered from the few sources available to us is that initially (late 1980s to early 1990s) Palestinian ‘versions’ or ‘narratives’ tended to elide over the topics of ancient Israel and Jews generally, treating them minimally or in a somewhat tortuously neutral fashion. Emphasis appears to have been placed on the alleged neglect of Islamic sites and periods, and on contextualizing ancient Israel, and Biblical archaeology as a whole, as merely episodes in much longer frameworks. This approach followed the lead of Glock. More recently (mid 1990s to present) the tendency has been to discount, excise, or wholly revise the questions of ancient Israel and any Jewish presence. Elite promotion of the ideas that Palestinians were descended from Canaanites, Philistines, or third millennium B.C.E. Arabian migrants, has been considerable, despite the lack of evidence or logic to support these claims, and their inherent contradiction with Islamic mythology. See “A historical battleground,” *Jerusalem Report*, September 30, 1997. See also the important study by Nimrod Hurvitz, “Muhibb ad-Din al-Khatib’s Semitic Wave Theory and Pan-Arabism,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 29 (1993): 118–34. Palestinian revisionism has not surprisingly coincided with Palestinian denial of any Jewish connection to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, an issue which, as noted by Shlomo Ben-Ami, manifest strongly during negotiations during 2000. See “End of a journey,” *Ha’aretz*, September 14, 2001. Some measure of inspiration for these latter developments has been derived from continuing academic debates over the historicity of the Bible, and the strong divisions between the unfortunately labeled ‘maximalist’ and ‘minimalist’ factions. Strongly anti-Zionist books by Biblical scholars Keith W. Whitelam, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History*, (London, 1996) and Thomas L. Thompson, *The Mythic Past: Biblical Archaeology and the Myth of Israel*, (New York, 1999) stand out. The intellectual influence of Hayden White and Edward Said might also be considered in this respect, along of course with the specific efforts of revisionist Israeli historians (e.g., Ilan Pappé, “Biblical Narratives, Review of *Western Scholarship and the History of Palestine*,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 29 (2000):102. These latest efforts to generate Palestinian identity in ‘real time’ should be understood in their

51. At the Hebrew University of Jerusalem there is an Institute of Archaeology and the Philip Berman Center for Biblical Archaeology, while Tel Aviv University has the Marco and Sonia Nadler Institute of Archaeology and the Department of Archaeology and Ancient Near Eastern Cultures. At Ben-Gurion University of the Negev archaeology is located in the Department of Bible and Ancient Near-Eastern Studies, and at Bar-Ilan University in the Institute of Archaeology and the Department of Land of Israel Studies. The University of Haifa has a separate Department of Archaeology. Some classical archaeologists may be located in departments of classics, history, or Jewish history. No archaeologists appear to be connected to departments of anthropology, or sociology-anthropology. These particular examples of institutional partitioning certainly do not imply the superiority of the American anthropological orientation, or the British pattern of separate archaeology departments.

52. For an informative and explicitly Marxian analysis see Thomas C. Patterson, “The Political Economy of Archaeology in the United States,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 28 (1999): 155–74. For the institutional structure of Israeli archaeology see Raz and De Groot (note 36). As if to illustrate the problem of finances, the Worker’s Committee of the Israeli Antiquities Authority called a strike for 23 December 2001 to protest budget cutbacks of some 17 million shekels, which would result in the layoff of some 100 full-time and 500 temporary employees, and reduction in all archaeological activities.


58. 58. See for example the replies to Clarke (note 54) from a committee within the leading American archaeological association, which point out his minority, and hence deviant, status. Kurt E. Dongoske, et al., “Letters to the Editor,” *SAA Archaeological Record*, 1/5 (Nov. 2001):3.

59. David Lowenthal, “Fabricating Heritage,” *History and Memory*, 10 (1998). In contrast, Maurice Halbwachs made the distinction between renditions of the past, scientific history and malleable memory, while Pierre Nora regarded premodern memory as a social and sentimental practice and modern memory as more structured, deliberate and voluntary. Both these approaches may be profitably explored to understand the contrasts between secular Israeli and *haredi* approaches to the past. It is also useful to compare here Scham’s (note 2) more ornate formulation of several models for the ‘archaeology of the disenfranchised’, including ‘heritage pride,’ ‘heritage recovery,’ and ‘reaction/resistance.’ That Israeli archaeology was all these simultaneously is clear, as indicated by Shavit (note 2).


D. Small, (eds.), *The Archaeology of Israel, Constructing the Past, Interpreting the Future*, (Sheffield, 1997) 62–81. For an interesting set of potential parallels see Millie Creighton, “Consuming Rural Japan: The Marketing of Tradition and Nostalgia in the Japanese Travel Industry,” *Ethnology*, 36 (1997): 239–54. For a recent discussion of Israeli identity see Anita Shapira, “From the Palmach Generation to the Candle Children: Changing Patterns in Israeli Identity,” *Partisan Review*, 67 (2000). See also Levy (note 9). Compare the Israeli identity experience with that of Turkey discussed by Ayse Kadioglu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32 (1996): 177–193, who notes how “the political climate that prevailed in the 1980s and early 1990s has opened the Kemalist Pandora’s box out of which have emerged multiple identities.” Israel’s parallels with India and Pakistan might also be profitably explored. For a recent discussion of social and collective memory see Michael G. Kenny, “A Place for Memory: The Interface between Individual and Collective History,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, (1999): 420–437, and for the assessment of assimilation as the overriding Jewish tragedy see for example “Dahan’s Holocaust remarks draw ire,” *Jerusalem Post*, December 31, 2001. In an address to the Orthodox General Assembly, rabbinical and lay leaders from around the world organized by the World Zionist Organization, Health Minister Nissim Dahan made the statement that given his estimation of 10,000,000 Jews present at Sinai, natural population growth should have produced a modern Jewish population of some 500,000,000. That this many Jews do not exist can be attributed to assimilation, “the worst catastrophe ever to beset the Jewish people.”


For Jordan see generally Linda L. Layne, *Home and Homeland: The Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan*, (Princeton, NJ, 1994), and Laurie A. Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: a Crisis of Identity,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24 (1995) 46. Protests against the excavation of human remains, directed by local religious authorities, in Jordan occurred at least sporadically during the mid-1980s. One of us (A.H.J.) was told by archaeologists directly subjected to these protests that they appear to have been inspired by local disputes over employment, and that they were resolved quietly without prolonged disruption of excavations.

